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This Note argues that civil RICO should not provide a remedy for a party claiming injury due
to the commercial bribery of a foreign official. Part I discusses the purposes and the legislative
history of the FCPA and RICO. Part II analyzes cases that apply RICO to FCPA violations. Part
III illustrates that applying civil RICO to FCPA violations frustrates congressional intent in en-
acting and amending both the FCPA and RICO. This Note concludes that under proper statutory
construction, civil RICO’s provisions do not apply to the act of bribing a foreign official.
NOTES
CIVIL RICO MISREAD: THE JUDICIAL REPEAL OF THE
1988 AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, the U.S. Congress enacted two controversial
statutes to proscribe criminal behavior that had previously es-
caped proper punishment. In reaction to international and do-
mestic bribery scandals, Congress enacted the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act (the "FCPA") to proscribe bribery of foreign
officials and to eliminate corporate slush funds used for brib-
ery.' Congress also enacted the Racketeer-Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") to enable prosecutors
and private litigants to combat organized crime and criminal
abuse of legitimate business.2
In 1988, Congress amended the FCPA's bribery provi-
sions by adding a scienter requirement, making corporate of-
ficers directly liable for violations, and increasing penalties for
violations.3 The weight ofjudicial authority has held that Con-
gress intended the FCPA to provide no express or implied pri-
vate right of action.' RICO, however, expressly provides a pri-
vate right of action in cases involving multiple mail fraud, wire
fraud, and Travel Act violations.5 These crimes are invariably
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2 & 78ff (1988) [hereinafter FCPA]. See
generally Perkins, Bibliography on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 14 W. ST. U.L.
REV. 491 (1987) (cataloguing legislative history, law review articles, cases, and trea-
tises on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 (1988) [hereinafter RICO].
3. See Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. V, § 5003(a), 102 Stat. 1415 (1988) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-l, 78dd-2 & 78ff (1988)).
4. See, e.g., Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990) (denying
private right of action under FCPA, but allowing antitrust claims based on payment
of bribes), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 961 (1991).
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988) (defining "racketeering activity"). The Travel
Act prohibits travelling in interstate or foreign commerce or using a facility in inter-
state or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to distribute the proceeds
of a number of unlawful activities, including bribery. See id. § 1952. The mail fraud
statute forbids using or causing the mails to be used in any scheme to defraud or "for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representa-
tions, or promises." Id. § 1341.
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the components of an FCPA violation.6 Consequently, a pri-
vate litigant who has no right of action under the FCPA may
have a right of action under RICO.7 This application of civil
RICO to provide a private right of action contrasts sharply
with the statutory scheme of the FCPA, in which Congress re-
jected a private right of action for bribing a foreign official in
favor of a system of civil and criminal governmental enforce-
ment backed with strong penalties.'
This Note argues that civil RICO should not provide a
remedy for a party claiming injury due to the commercial brib-
ery of a foreign official. Part I discusses the purposes and the
legislative history of the FCPA and RICO. Part II analyzes
cases that apply RICO to FCPA violations. Part III illustrates
that applying civil RICO to FCPA violations frustrates congres-
sional intent in enacting and amending both the FCPA and
RICO. This Note concludes that under proper statutory con-
struction, civil RICO's provisions do not apply to the act of
bribing a foreign official.
I. STATUTES GOVERNING FOREIGN BRIBERY
A. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
1. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Scandals involving illegal corporate payments to public of-
ficials uncovered by the Watergate investigations spurred Con-
gress to prohibit such corrupt payments.9 The Watergate in-
6. Id. §§ 1961-1968; see id. § 1952 (prohibiting travel or use of mails in further-
ance of bribery scheme); see also Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc.,
847 F.2d 1052, 1063-64 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that single bribery scheme involving
multiple payments is violation of civil RICO), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990); Baruch,
International Transactions Which Violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or Other Criminal
Statutes, in LAw & PRAc. OF U.S. REG. OF INT'L TRADE, Release 89-1, Booklet 11, 49-57
(C. Johnston ed. 1989) (discussing how FCPA violation may also be mail fraud, wire
fraud, antitrust, RICO or Travel Act violation).
7. See Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (allowing RICO appli-
cation to FCPA violations to create private right of action).
8. Compare Lamb v. Phillip Morris, 915 F.2d 1024 (determining that Congress
intended no private right of action under FCPA), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 961 (1991)
with Environmental Tectonics, 110 S. Ct. 701 (holding that competitor alleging business
injury may sue for treble damages). See infra note 30 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Congress's rejection of private damages action for FCPA violations).
9. See S. REP. No. 486, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1986) (views of Sen. Proxmire).
The Watergate investigations examined the secret corporate funds that were used to
finance the Committee to Re-elect former U.S. President Richard M. Nixon; see also
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vestigations uncovered secret corporate funds used to finance
not only illicit domestic political contributions, but also bribery
of high-level foreign officials.' 0 Congress found that hundreds
of companies had paid huge bribes to foreign officials through
these funds." The scandals emanating from these revelations
subsequently caused the resignation of many important for-
eign officials, especially in Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands.' 2
As a result, Congress passed the FCPA to prevent future scan-
dals that might hinder the executive branch's ability to conduct
U.S. foreign policy.' 3 In addition, Congress considered that
bribery diminished the credibility of U.S. corporations, result-
ing in loss of business. 14 The FCPA, moreover, comported
with international legal consensus on the impropriety of brib-
ing a foreign official.t5
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLE-
GAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 37-39 (Comm. Print 1976) (SEC survey of
ninety-five corporations in which fifty-four admitted making payments to foreign offi-
cials); Baruch, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing 1988 FCPA amendments and other stat-
utes that apply to bribery of foreign officials); Note, Prohibiting Foreign Bribes: Criminal
Sanctions for Corporate Payments Abroad, 10 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 231 (1977).
10. See S. REP. No. 486, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1986) (views of Sen.
Proxmire) (discussing bribery of high-level foreign officials).
11. See 134 CONG. REC. S15909 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Wirth). Senator Wirth noted that the FCPA "was a response to the revelations in the
1970's when more than 450 corporations disclosed millions of dollars in illegal or
questionable payments to foreign agents." Id.; see 123 CONG. REC. 38,778 (1977)
(statement of Rep. Eckhardt); Baruch, supra note 6, at 3; see also McLaughlin, The
Criminalization of Questionable Foreign Payments by Corporations: A Comparative Legal Systems
Analysis, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1071, 1072 (1978) (discussing FCPA's origins).
12. See McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 1072; see also S. REP. No. 486, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 20-21 (1986) (views of Sen. Proxmire) (discussing governmental scandals
relating to foreign officials accepting U.S. bribes).
13. H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977); see Note, Foreign Corrupt
Practices: Creating an Exception to the Act of State Doctrine, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 203, 221-22
(1984) (discussing congressional foreign policy concerns).
14. H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1977); 123 CONG. REC. 38,778
(1977); see Note, Corruption and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 13 MICH. J.L.
REFORM 158, 162-63 (1979) (discussing circumstances surrounding FCPA's enact-
ment). Other effects of bribery of foreign officials played a role in the FCPA's enact-
ment. See S. REP. No. 486, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1986) (views of Sen. Proxmire)
(noting that in both Iraq and Libya, "degree of corruption in the regime was a factor
in the loss of public confidence that made a successful revolution possible").
15. See Report of the Economic and Social Council Committee On An International Agree-
ment On Illicit Payments, U.N. Doc. E/1979/104 (May 25, 1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M.
1025 (1979); Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development Press Release A(76)20 (June 21,
1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 967 (1976); Permanent Council Resolution on the Behavior of
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In enacting the FCPA, Congress attacked foreign bribery
in two ways." First, Congress instituted preventative account-
ing measures.' 7 Congress viewed these measures as a way to
curb undisclosed payoffs.'" The FCPA's accounting measures
require business entities operating abroad to make a good
faith effort to set up reasonably detailed internal accounting
mechanisms. '9
Second, Congress imposed punitive antibribery provi-
sions.2 0 The antibribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit busi-
ness entities from making or promising to make a payment or
gift directly or through an agent when the entity had "reason
to know" that the payment would go to a foreign official. 2 '
The prohibition applies to payments made to influence an act
or decision of a foreign official in his official capacity or in vio-
lation of his lawful duty.22 To violate the FCPA, the business
entity must make the payment to induce the foreign official to
help the payor obtain, direct, or retain business.2 3 The FCPA
reaches only transactions where some action to assist the trans-
action took place "corruptly" in the United States through an
Transnational Enterprises, Organization of American States CP/Res. No. 154 (167/75)
(July 10, 1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1326 (1975) (recommending codes of ethical
conduct for transnational corporations); Commission on Ethical Practices Recommendations
to Combat Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, International Chamber of Com-
merce Pub. No. 315 (1977), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 417 (1978) (condemning bribery
and requesting home and host governments to take measures to prevent corrupt
practices).
16. See S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976) (noting that FCPA is
comprised of both disclosure requirements and criminal prohibitions).
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988).
18. 123 CONG. REC. 38,778 (1977); see Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977: An Analysis of Its Impact and Future, 5 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 405, 426
(1982) (discussing Congress' goals in enacting FCPA).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), (e) & 78m (1988).
20. See id. §§ 78dd-2(g) & 78ff.
21. Id. § 78dd-l(a)(1). The FCPA applies to business entities having securities
registered under 15 U.S.C. § 781 or required to file reports under 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).
Id. § 78dd- l(a). In addition, the FCPA applies to "any officer, director, employee, or
agent" of those business entities acting on behalf of the business. Id. § 78dd-1(a).
The FCPA also applies to certain publicly-owned companies and their agents. Id.
§ 78dd-2. By its language, the FCPA applies only to "domestic concern[s]." Id.
§ 78dd-2(d)(l). Although foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations are not liable on
the face of the FCPA, the statute reaches them in the majority of cases. See Baruch,
supra note 6, at 8.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(3)(A) (1988).
23. Id. § 78dd-l(a).
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instrumentality of interstate commerce.2" FCPA violations
carry heavy penalties.25
The FCPA's prohibitions provided prosecutors with an ef-
fective recourse against business entities bribing foreign offi-
cials.2 6 Prior to the enactment of the FCPA, prosecutors relied
principally on mail and wire fraud statutes to reach those who
bribed foreign officials. 27 The FCPA granted principal investi-
gative authority and civil enforcement power to the U.S. Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission, and delegated subsequent
criminal enforcement power to the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice.28 The FCPA, set up as a prosecutorial tool, contains no
reference to a private right of action.29 Moreover, the legisla-
tive history contains multiple congressional refusals to grant a
24. Id. § 78dd-I(a). As one commentator noted, the requirement of an action in
the United States,
couched in terms of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, is a neces-
sary element in order for Congress to exercise its legislative powers over
such activities. In most cases, there will clearly be one or more "corrupt"
actions, such as the transmission of monies abroad by wire, by letter, or by
ship or plane, with the knowledge that the monies are to be used for an
illegal payment. Other examples of actions which meet the jurisdictional
means test would include a transatlantic phone call . . . during which an
illegal offer was made or approved.
Baruch, supra note 6, at 32-33.
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1988). The FCPA, as enacted, carried a US$1,000,000
maximum penalty for corporations violating the statute, and US$10,000 maximum
fine along with a maximum of five years in jail for officers of the corporation violating
the statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1982). Congressional concern for enhanced pun-
ishment was evidenced by an increase in the maximum fines for FCPA violations to
US$2,000,000 for corporations and US$100,000 for individuals with a maximum of
five years in prison. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g) (1988); see also S. REP. No. 486, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986).
26. 122 CONG. REC. 30,419, 30,422 (1976) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (dis-
cussing FCPA's potential deterrent effect); see Note, supra note 9, at 233 (discussing
FCPA's potential role as prosecutorial tool).
27. See Letter from Elliot Richardson, Chairman of the President's Task Force
on Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad, to Sen. William Proxmire, June 11,
1976, at 3, reprinted in Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Officials: Hearing on S. 3133, S. 3379,
and S. 3418 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 39-67 (1976).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (d)-(f) (1988) (delegating enforcement power); S.
REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) (discussing delegation of enforcement
power); 123 CONG. REC. H38,778-79 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1977) (statement of Rep. Eck-
hardt); see also Bliss & Spak, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1988: Clarification or
Evisceration?, 20 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 441, 446 (1989) (outlining FCPA enforce-
ment scheme).
29. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-l, 78dd-2 & 78ff (1988).
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private right of action under the FCPA.3 °
2. The 1988 Amendments to the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The FCPA's enactment brought immediate cries of protest
from the business community, which claimed that the vague-
ness of the accounting and antibribery provisions rendered
compliance with the FCPA's provisions impossible. 31  The
FCPA's sweeping language, heavy financial penalties, and
prison terms disturbed businesses that found themselves un-
able to establish cost-efficient guidelines for compliance with
the FCPA's provisions.3 2 Fear of damage to reputation ensu-
ing from an FCPA indictment augmented corporate con-
cerns. 33 During congressional hearings following the FCPA's
30. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 3 (1976) (report to accom-
pany S. 3664). This bill, S. 3379, a predecessor to the FCPA, introduced by Senator
Frank Church, provided an express private cause of action for shareholders and com-
petitors. Id. at 12; see S. 3379, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at §§ 9-10, reprinted in 122 CONG.
REC. 12,604, 12,607 (1976). These provisions provided for recovery of actual dam-
ages and attorneys' fees. Id. The Senate subsequently deleted the provisions creat-
ing a cause of action. S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1976). Senator
Church also proposed an amendment to S. 3664, another FCPA predecessor bill,
that would have provided competitors with a private right of action for treble dam-
ages and attorneys' fees. Amendment No. 2292, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG.
REC. 30,333 (1976). The Senate defeated the Church Amendment shortly after U.S.
Secretary of Commerce Elliot L. Richardson submitted a letter to the Senate oppos-
ing the treble damages provision. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Elliot L. Rich-
ardson to Senator John Tower (Sept. 15, 1976), quoted in 122 CONG. REC. 30,419
(1976); see Siegel, The Implication Doctrine and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1109 (1979). The final bill approved by the Senate, S. 305, had
no reference to private rights of action. 123 CONG. REC. S919 (daily ed. Jan. 18,
1977); see id. at S19,401 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1977) (statement of Sen. John Tower) ("In
view of the existing case law, it is difficult to conceive that the courts would imply a
cause of action ... neither the Senate nor the conferees expressed any opinion on
the issue."); id. at H12,825 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1977) (statement of Rep. Samuel L.
Devine) ("I want to point out that the conferees did not intend to create a private
right of action").
31. See Note, Revision of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by the 1988 Omnibus Trade
Bill: Will it Reduce the Compliance Burdens and Anticompetitive Impact? 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV.
491, 494-95 (1989) (analyzing "chilling effect" of 1977 FCPA on U.S. exports). But
see Note, supra note 18, at 429-30 (asserting that effect of FCPA not detrimental to
U.S. trade).
32. See Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Joint Hearing on S. 414
Before the Subcomm. on Int 'l Finance and Monetary Policy and the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 77-78 (1983)
(statements of Michael A. Samuels of U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
33. See Note, supra note 31, at 494-95.
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enactment, industry experts and economic analysts testified to
the FCPA's chilling effect on U.S. exports.3 4
As part of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act,15 Congress
amended both the accounting and the antibribery provisions
of the FCPA to enhance U.S. foreign trade and competitive-
ness.3 6 Congress intended to clarify the FCPA's provisions to
provide guidance to the legal and business communities.3
Although the business community's complaints provided
much of the impetus for the formulation of the FCPA's 1988
amendments, the most compelling consideration was the need
to enhance U.S. competitiveness.38 Congress balanced four
competing concerns in amending the FCPA's antibribery pro-
visions: foreign policy, national competitiveness, prevention,
and punishment.3 9 Throughout the lengthy amendment pro-
34. See Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What is to be Done with the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act?, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431 (1987) (discussing congressional
hearings on FCPA's "chilling effect").
35. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
36. See Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. V, § 5003(a), 102 Stat. 1415 (1988) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2 & 78fl). See generally Baruch, supra
note 6 (discussing 1988 FCPA amendments and other statutes that apply to bribery
of foreign officials); Bliss & Spak, supra note 28 (discussing effect of 1988 FCPA
amendments); Fremanti & Katz, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, 23
INT'L LAw. 755 (1989); Note, supra note 31 (analyzing effects of 1988 FCPA amend-
ments on U.S. exports); see also Longobardi, supra note 34 (outlining history of FCPA
amendment process).
37. See 131 CONG. REC. 32,763, 32,778 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985) (noting that
1977 FCPA was unclear and inhibited exports).
38. See id. (expressing Congress's intent to provide guidance for business); see
also Bliss & Spak, supra note 28, at 442 (discussing Congress's concern with national
competitiveness).
39. See generally Longobardi, supra note 34 (outlining congressional concerns
during amendment process). The Senate Report stated that
[t]he Committee recognizes the continuing need for international agree-
ments outlawing bribery in the international marketplace. The unilateral
position currently taken by the United States in terms of anti-bribery legisla-
tion, while laudable, constitutes a serious disadvantage to U.S. commerce.
The Committee recognizes that bribery warps appropriate trade patterns
and distorts the market as an efficient allocator of resources, but it believes
that the most useful approach to this problem is a multilateral one.
The Committee bill would enhance U.S. efforts to achieve such interna-
tional agreement by presenting a statute that effectively curbs bribery with-
out imposing unnecessary trade disincentives. Recognizing this need, the
bill calls for renewed efforts, both on multilateral and bilateral levels, to
achieve international agreement on the prohibition of bribery.
S. REP. No. 486, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986).
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cess,4 ° Congress was satisfied that the FCPA had a salutary ef-
fect on the executive's foreign policy powers.4 In addition,
Congress considered that the FCPA's preventative role had
been effective.42 On balance, however, Congress accepted the
general criticism from the business community that the FCPA's
vague standards inhibited both competitiveness and enforce-
ment.43 In addition, Congress noted that a multilateral ap-
proach would be the most effective way to combat bribery of
foreign officials and that a too-strict unilateral U.S. prohibition
would distort competition to the disadvantage of U.S. corpora-
tions.44 Accordingly, in 1988, Congress amended the FCPA to
make it both clear and precise.45
In the 1988 amendments, Congress first set out to define
the scienter requirement for violations of both the accounting
and antibribery provisions." The original FCPA imposed the
recordkeeping requirement without specifying the requisite in-
tent for a violation.4 7 To rectify this omission, the 1988
amendments provided that only violations committed "know-
ingly" were subject to criminal liability.48 Congress intended
this amendment to reduce the cost of compliance with ac-
counting provisions, and to assuage the fears of firms anticipat-
ing sanctions for mere negligence or insufficiently detailed re-
cordkeeping procedures.4 9 Similarly, the 1988 amendments
40. See Fremanti & Katz, supra note 36, at 759. Proposals to amend the FCPA
were introduced in 1980, 1981, 1983, and 1985. See id. at 759 n.27.
41. Cf. 134 CONG. REC. 8736-38 (1988) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (noting
that 1988 amendments reversed good results of FCPA).
42. See 131 CONG. REC. S32,763, S32,778 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1985) (stating that
Congress found FCPA's enactment positive step towards prohibiting foreign brib-
ery).
43. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. S15,959 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985) (finding that
FCPA "caused unnecesary concern among existing and potential exporters as to the
scope of legitimate overseas business activities").
44. See id. (finding that "solution to the problem of corrupt payments by firms to
obtain or retain business demands and [sic] international approach; accordingly, ap-
propriate international agreements should be initiated and sought").
45. See Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. V, § 5003(a), 102 Stat. 1415 (1988) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2 & 78ff).
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A) (1988) (defining requisite state of mind for
FCPA violation); see also Elden & Sableman, Negligence is Not Corruption: The Scienter
Requirement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 819 (1981) (dis-
cussing uncertainty of original FCPA scienter requirement).
47. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982).
48. See id. § 78m(b)(4) & (5) (1988).
49. See 131 CONG. REC. 2146 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1985) (noting excessive concern
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changed the antibribery scienter requirement from the broad
"reason to know" to the narrower "while knowing" standard,
which would require actual knowledge or willful ignorance.5"
The 1988 antibribery amendments exempted certain pay-
ments from the FCPA's reach. 5' The FCPA's prohibitions now
exempt any payment to a foreign official if the payment is
made in order to expedite or to secure the performance of a
routine governmental action.52 The amendments also added
two affirmative defenses that further limit the types of pay-
ments for which a business may be liable.53 The first defense is
that the payment made was lawful under the written laws of the
official's country.54 The second defense is that the payment
was reasonable and bona fide, covering, for example, travel
and lodging expenses related directly to the promotion of a
product or to the execution of a contract.55
The 1988 amendments define previously vague terms
such as "foreign official,"' 56 "knowing," ' 57 and "routine govern-
among businesses caused by FCPA's lack of clarity); see also Statement of Policy Con-
cerning the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Exchange Act Release No. 17,500, 21
S.C.C. Docket 1466, reprinted in 46 Fed. Reg. 11,544 (1988); Bliss & Spak, supra note
28, at 452 (noting vexatious provisions).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(3) (1988). The 1977 FCPA's lack of a scienter re-
quirement set off a debate among critics as to what conduct the FCPA would reach.
See, e.g., Elden & Sableman, supra note 46, at 819 (discussing 1977 FCPA's scienter
standard).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (1988) (excepting payments made to secure rou-
tine governmental actions from FCPA's purview); Bliss & Spak, supra note 28, at 455-
57 (analyzing purpose of exception).
52. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b) & 78dd-2(b) (1988).
53. See id. §§ 78dd-l(c) & 78dd-2(c) (providing affirmative defenses for pay-
ments that are legal under foreign country's law or for payments to reimburse for-
eign officials' bona fide expenses relating to contract performance or product promo-
tion); see also Bliss & Spak, supra note 28, at 458 (discussing Congress's choice to
enact affirmative defenses rather than exceptions).
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c)(1) (1988); Bliss & Spak, supra note 28, at 458 (dis-
cussion of "written law" affirmative defenses).
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2) (1988); see also Bliss & Spak, supra note 28, at
458 (discussing scope of bona fide expense defense).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(1) (1988). The FCPA now defines "foreign official" as
"any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of
any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality." Id.
57. Id. § 78dd-l(f)(2)(A). Under the FCPA, a person's state of mind is "know-
ing" if
with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, ... (i) such person is
aware that such person is engaging in such conduct, that such circumstance
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mental action."58 The amendments provide businesses with a
low-cost, streamlined procedure for determining the legality of
a transaction by requiring the Attorney General to issue a legal
opinion on a transaction within thirty days of a corporation's
request.5 9 The amendments, however, failed to address the is-
sue of a private right of action. 6°
At the time of the amendment process, the enforcement
policy of the U.S. Department of Justice was to treat the FCPA
as the sole criminal statute that applied in cases of bribery of
foreign officials. 6 ' An amendment was proposed that would
have made the FCPA the sole criminal statute that could be
applied in the case of foreign bribery. 62 This original "exclu-
sivity" proposal cited mail and wire fraud, conspiracy, "and
other criminal statutes."6 3 The legislative history contains no
specific reference to RICO.
During Senate hearings, a commentator pointed out that
the suggested language in the Senate proposal, intended to
exists, or that such result is substantially certain to occur; or (ii) such person
has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result is substan-
tially certain to occur.
Id.
58. Id. § 78dd-l(f)(3)(A). The FCPA defines "routine governmental action" as
[an action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official
in - (1) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a
person to do business in a foreign country; (2) processing governmental
papers, such as visas and work orders; (3) providing police protection, mail
pickup and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract per-
formance or inspection related to transit of goods across country; (4) pro-
viding phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo,
or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or (5)
actions of a similar nature.
Id.
59. See id. § 78dd- I (e). The statute, as amended, provides a review procedure to
ensure that payments meet the standards of both the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and the U.S. Department of Justice.
60. See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that
neither FCPA nor conference report accompanying FCPA contain reference to pri-
vate right of action), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 961 (1991).
61. See Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Joint Hearings on S.
708 Before the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing, And Urban Affairs United States Senate on S. 708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 155
(1981) (testimony of Robert McNeill, Executive Vice Chairman, Emergency Commit-
tee for American Trade) (supporting exclusivity provision to codify Justice Depart-
ment policy).
62. See id. at 28 (containing text of exclusivity proposal).
63. See id.
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block the Justice Department's use of other statutes to increase
FCPA liability, would immunize someone who committed mur-
der in furtherance of the bribery of a foreign official. 64 The
commentator proposed alternative wording to the effect that
the FCPA would be the sole remedy for actions that would be
legal but for the intent and effort to bribe a foreign official,
thereby blocking use of the wire and mail fraud statutes, but
allowing prosecution of other crimes.65
The provision eventually adopted by the U.S. Senate, only
to be rejected by the House-Senate Conference Committee,
would have required criminal prosecution of an overseas cor-
poration exclusively as an FCPA violation where the prosecu-
tion was based on the theory that a foreign official defrauded
or violated a fiduciary duty to a foreign government or its citi-
zens. 66 In addition, the bill would have blocked charges for
conspiracy to violate the mail or wire fraud statutes brought
under the same theory.6 7 The House-Senate Conference
Committee rejected this prosecutorial limitation to allow the
government to act in instances where it could not meet the
burden of proof for an FCPA violation, but where it could
show some wrongdoing.68
At the time of the amendments, Congress presumably
knew of efforts to apply RICO in the criminal and civil context
to many other statutes, including the FCPA.69 Congress also
knew that courts had denied shareholders the right to bring
64. See id. at 426 (testimony of Prof. Philip P. Heymann of Harvard Law School).
65. Id.
66. See 131 CONG. REC. S15,959 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985) (providing that "no
criminal action... may be brought against a domestic concern ... based upon the
theory that the foreign official or domestic concern violated a duty to or defrauded
the foreign government or the citizens of a foreign country").
67. See id.
68. See 134 CONG. REC. H183 & H2117 (1988) (containing conference commit-
tee rejection of Senate's exclusivity provision).
69. See Bosco v. Serhant, 836 F.2d 271, 275 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that in inter-
preting statute, court must assume that Congress was aware of current case law).
Congress had ample notice of judicial difficulty in determining RICO's relationship
to unrelated laws, including the FCPA. See Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639, 641-
42 (E.D. Ky. 1988); see also Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926 (11 th Cir. 1987); Nodine v.
Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1987). Contra Komm v. McFliker, 662 F. Supp.
924 (W.D. Mo. 1987); Callan v. State Chem. Mfg. Co., 584 F. Supp. 619, 621 n.2
(E.D. Pa. 1984). The Williams court, after analyzing RICO's relationship to other
statutes, concluded that indirect injury due to FCPA violation is a sufficient basis for a
RICO claim under section 1962(a) or (c). See Williams, 683 F. Supp. at 641-42.
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derivative actions based on unlawful payments to foreign offi-
cials.7 ° In addition, Congress presumably was aware that
courts would not easily imply a private right of action in the
FCPA context, because a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision
had presumed against implied private rights of action, requir-
ing instead that Congress provide explicitly for a private right
of action when drafting legislation. 7'
Congress enacted the FCPA amendments to define the sci-
enter standard for violations, to clarify the class of payments
prohibited, to increase penalties for violations, and to provide
guidance and uniform treatment for the business community.72
The amendments provide corporations and individuals with a
clearer idea of what behavior violates the law and foster in-
creased investment and operations abroad. 73  The amend-
ments contain no provision permitting or blocking prosecution
of FCPA violations under the mail fraud, wire fraud, or RICO
statutes.74
B. The Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
Congress enacted RICO, a remedial statute comprised of
criminal and civil provisions, to correct weaknesses built into
federal and state penal codes and to combat organized crime.75
At the time of RICO's enactment, Congress perceived these
70. See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1145 (1982) (dismissing as immaterial shareholder's derivative suit based on
Lockheed's improper payments to boost sales abroad); Abbey v. Control Data Corp.,
603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980) (dismissing share-
holder suit).
71. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979) (noting that
"when Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy, it knew how to do so
and did so expressly").
72. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's reasons
for 1988 amendments).
73. See Note, supra note 31, at 494-95 (outlining criticisms of 1977 FCPA to
which Congress responded with 1988 amendments).
74. See 134 CONG. REC. H183 & H2117 (1988) (conference committee rejecting
Senate's exclusivity provision).
75. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 923 (1970). The purpose of the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act of 1970 was
to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strength-
ening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new
penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies
to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
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penal codes, designed to punish individuals engaging in iso-
lated incidents of criminal behavior, to be unneccessarily lim-
ited in scope and impact with respect to organized crime.76 In
Congress's view, these penal codes did not dissuade career
criminals from organizing for criminal purposes, and did not
dissuade those who invested criminal proceeds in legitimate
businesses.77
Congress created RICO in 1970 to combat organized
crime.78  Prior to RICO's creation, prosecutors relied on mul-
tiple counts of mail and wire fraud to prosecute career
criminals engaged in racketeering activities. 79 The financial
penalties provided through use of these fraud statutes were,
however, insufficient to take the profit out of organized
crime.80
Congress drafted RICO to attack the use of profits derived
from criminal activity, not the crimes themselves.8 ' RICO for-
bids investment of proceeds derived from a pattern of racke-
teering, acquiring an interest in a business with racketeering
proceeds, or conducting an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering. 2 "Racketeering activity" includes any acts or
threats involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, rob-
bery, bribery, extortion, dealing in narcotics, mail and wire
fraud, and other specified federal crimes.8 3 Under RICO, a
"pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two predi-
cate acts of "racketeering activity" to take place within ten
76. See 84 Stat. 923 (1970) (outlining Congress's purposes in enacting RICO).
77. See Lynch, RICO. The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & 11, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
661, 663 (1987) (outlining RICO's purposes).
78. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988); see also Lynch, supra note 77, at 662 (dis-
cussing intent of Congress in enacting RICO).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), afd in
relevant part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979); see Gevurtz, Using the Antitrust Laws to
Combat Overseas Bribery by Foreign Companies: A Step to Even the Odds in International Trade,
27 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 214 (1987) (noting prosecutors' use of mail and wire fraud
statutes to reach foreign bribes); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1343 (1988) (broadly
prohibiting interstate use of mails and wires in furtherance of illegal purposes).
80. See Lynch, supra note 77, at 663 (discussing RICO's purposes).
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988) (prohibiting use or investment of proceeds of
racketeering activity).
82. See id. § 1962 (a)-(c). Conspiracy to violate these sections is also prohibited.
Id. § 1962(d). "Predicate act" is an informal term used by courts instead of "act of
racketeering activity."
83. Id. § 1961(l)(A)-(D).
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years of each other.84 In addition, the acts must be related and
continuous to constitute a pattern.85
Congress mandated that the courts liberally construe
RICO's provisions in order to effect its remedial purposes of
eradicating organized crime and eliminating loopholes in fed-
eral and state penal codes that would otherwise allow career
criminals to escape with light penalties.86 RICO's penalties are
severe, including, for example, mandatory forfeiture provi-
sions that are limited only by the extent of a violator's stake in
the enterprise or assets traceable therefrom.' In addition, a
RICO conviction carries a prison sentence of up to twenty
years.8
Congress provided for private enforcement of RICO to
add to the government's prosecutorial resources and to pro-
vide relief to those injured by criminal activity. 89 Accordingly,
84. Id. § 1961(5); see Note, The Application of RICO to International Terrorism, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 1071, 1072-3 n.ll (1990).
85. See HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989) (requir-
ing showing of continuity and relationship to establish RICO pattern). Justice Scalia,
in a sharply worded concurrence to the Court's establishment of this requirement,
noted that
[ellevating to the level of statutory text [the requirements of relationship
and continuity] ... taken from the legislative history, the Court counsels the
lower courts: "continuity plus relationship." This seems to me about as
helpful to the conduct of their affairs as "life is a fountain." . . . Unfortu-
nately, if normal (and sensible) rules of statutory construction were followed
... whatever "pattern" might mean in RICO, it assuredly does not mean that.
Id. at 252 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
86. Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970). Section 904 of
Title IX Public Law Number 91-452 provided that "[t]he provisions of this title...
shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id.
87. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988). RICO requires that a party be injured "by rea-
son of" RICO violations. Id. Section 1964(c) provides that
[any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id.; see Note, Civil RICO is a Misnomer: The Need for Criminal Procedural Protections in
Actions Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964, 100 HARV. L, REV. 1288, 1292 & n.33 (1987) (noting
that civil RICO recoveries may greatly exceed corresponding criminal penalties for
proscribed behavior).
88. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
89. See Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 567 F. Supp.
1146, 1157 (D.NJ. 1983) (discussing Congress's intent in enacting RICO), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985); see
also Note, The Conflict Over RICO's Private Treble Damages Action, 70 CORNELL L. REV.
903 (1985) (discussing judicial attempts to narrow civil RICO's application).
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RICO's civil provisions allow private and public civil remedies,
including a cause of action for any person sustaining business
or property injury due to a RICO violation.90 To encourage
private parties to bear the burden of conducting expensive liti-
gation, RICO allows an injured party to recover treble dam-
ages and attorney's fees. 9' Plaintiffs have brought civil RICO
suits against not only the career criminals targeted by Con-
gress in drafting RICO, but also against public entities and
corporations.92 The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that civil
RICO's private damages remedy was enacted over the objec-
tions of several members of Congress, who expressed concern
that the remedy might be used against legitimate businesses
rather than organized crime entities. 93
Although Congress's original intent in drafting RICO was
to punish criminal infiltration of legitimate businesses,94
RICO's liberal construction rule has led courts to allow actions
against anyone who commits more than one act in furtherance
of a criminal scheme and whose behavior satisfies RICO's
broad "pattern" requirement.95 One commentator, noting ar-
guments made in favor of using civil RICO to restore the in-
tegrity of interstate commerce in a manner similar to antitrust
laws, observed that Congress had never even considered that
civil RICO might be used in such a fashion.96 In fact, the U.S.
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988).
91. Id. § 1964(c).
92. See, e.g., Genty v. Township of Gloucester, 736 F. Supp. 1322 (D.NJ. 1990)
(involving civil RICO action against township); Fiore v. Kelly Run Sanitation, Inc.,
609 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (involving civil RICO action against state agency);
see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that corpo-
ration may conspire with own officers to conduct RICO enterprise); Liquid Air Corp.
v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that corporation may be "person"
under RICO), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 917 (1989); United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23,
30-31 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that RICO applies to activities used to corrupt public
officials), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982).
93. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 487 (1985) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58, 187 (1970)).
94. See Lynch, supra note 77, at 662.
95. See, e.g., Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052
(3d Cir. 1988), afd, 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990) (holding that even single episode of brib-
ery can constitute RICO pattern).
96. Reed, The Defense Casefor RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691, 709-11 (1990).
Another commentator noted that the judicial system's failure to interpret narrowly
civil RICO requires congressional action to limit private actions. See generally
Getzendanner, Judicial "Pruning" of "Garden Variety Fraud" Civil RICO Cases Does Not
Work: It's Time For Congress To Act, 43 VAND. L. REV. 673 (1990).
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Supreme Court itself noted that private plaintiffs' use of the
civil RICO statute had gone beyond what Congress had in-
tended.9 '
Corporations have difficulty assessing potential liability
for civil RICO violations because courts are currently divided
as to whether an injury must be direct for a party to have
standing to bring an action under RICO.9 8 Indeed, one expert
testified before Congress that the private bar's use of civil
RICO has undermined the necessary role of prosecutorial dis-
97. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500 (stating that "in its private civil version, RICO is
evolving into something quite different from the original conception of its enac-
tors"); see also Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d
384, 399 (7th Cir. 1984), af'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985). In Haroco, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that "[w]ith respect to the case before us, it
does not seem at all likely that Congress anticipated the application of civil RICO to
improperly calculated interest charges by a commercial bank." Id.; see 136 CONG.
REC. E 2086 (1990) (statement of Rep. William J. Hughes). The sponsor of a bill to
reform civil RICO noted that
it is clear from legislative history that the primary purpose for allowing pri-
vate suits under RICO was to promote the public interest by allowing so-
called "private attorneys general" suits. It was based on the premise that
these civil suits would supplement governmental action and attack real crim-
inal conduct-not just contract disputes written up to sound like crimes.
Id.
98. Compare Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21 (2d Cir.
1990) (denying RICO standing to employee) and Burdick v. American Express Co.,
865 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (denying RICO standing to employee ter-
minated for claims of fraudulent employer conduct) and Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l
Bank, 859 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1988) (denying RICO standing to employee dis-
charged for refusal to participate in fraudulent bank loan scheme) and Nodine v. Tex-
tron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1987) (denying RICO standing to employee termi-
nated for reporting Canadian customs laws and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act viola-
tions) with Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989)
(granting RICO standing to terminated employee) and Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926
(11 th Cir. 1987) (granting RICO standing to employee discharged for report of ir-
regular transactions to Comptroller of the Currency) and Williams v. Hall, 683 F.
Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (granting RICO standing to employee refusing to partici-
pate in FCPA violation) and Komm v. McFliker, 662 F. Supp. 924 (W.D. Mo. 1987)
(granting RICO standing to employee discharged for reporting illegal behavior).
In his dissent to the landmark civil RICO case Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. ,Justice
Marshall noted that
the defendant, facing a tremendous financial exposure in addition to the
threat of being labeled a "racketeer," will have a strong interest in settling
the dispute .... Many a prudent defendant, facing ruinous exposure, will
decide to settle even a case with no merit. It is thus not surprising that civil
RICO has been used for extortive purposes, giving rise to the very evils that
it was designed to combat.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 504-06 (1985) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
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cretion that Congress took into account when it drafted
RICO's broad language.99
II. PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE FCPA
The FCPA has had an uncertain history of governmental
enforcement, with little criminal case law examining the FCPA
until 1990.100 In the private civil realm, a recent U.S. Supreme
99. See RICO REFORM: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 99TH CONG., IST & 2D
SESS. ON H.R. 2517, H.R. 2943, H.R. 4892, H.R. 5290, H.R. 5391, AND H.R. 5445,
H.R. REP. No. 140, at 178-79 (Comm. Print 1986) (statement of Newton N. Minow).
Minow, quoting from the U.S. Attorney's manual, noted that
[t]he Manual states that despite the broad statutory language and the liberal
construction clause, "it is the policy of the Criminal Division that RICO be
selectively and uniformly used," and that RICO prosecutions would not be
brought in "every case in which technically the elements of a RICO violation
exist .. " Thus, a criminal RICO count that "merely duplicates" the ele-
ments of proof of a traditional Hobbs Act, Travel Act, mail fraud, wire
fraud, gambling or controlled substances cases will not be asserted absent
extraordinary circumstances. The Manual recognizes that if a proposed
RICO claim serves only some evidentiary purpose rather than attacking "the
activity which Congress most directly addressed - the infiltration of organ-
ized crime into the nation's economy," approval for prosecution would be
given in exceptional circumstances....
This reasoned interpretation of the statute and its purposes permits the
Justice Department to focus its attention on the evil Congress sought to
eliminate .... Although there is no indication that the civil remedy was to
have any broader scope than the criminal provision which it supplements,
private plaintiffs do not, and cannot be expected to, apply the interpretation
of the Justice Department.
Id.
100. See generally Turza, Corrupt Practices Act: How Far Have We Come?, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 5, 1990, at 5 (noting that "[tlo date there have been no convictions under the
[FCPA] amendments"). In the context of governmental civil and criminal enforce-
ment, courts have addressed the conflict between the FCPA and RICO. See United
States v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 334 (D. Conn. 1990); United States v.
Blondek, 741 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1990), affd sub nom. U.S. v. Castle, 925 F.2d
831 (5th Cir. 1991).
In United States v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., the government prosecuted an advertis-
ing agency that had bribed a Jamaican official to obtain an account. Young & Rubicam,
741 F. Supp. 334. The court noted that "the indictment does not charge defendants
with substantive violations of either FCPA or the Travel Act." Id. at 338. The court
rejected the defendant's argument that the use of the Travel Act, a general statute, as
a RICO predicate instead of the FCPA, a specific statute directly applicable to de-
fendant's conduct, was improper. Id. The court rejected the defendant's argument
that the mail fraud statute had often been used as a RICO predicate even though a
more specific statute directly prohibited the underlying scheme. Id. The court noted
that the government, by not charging the defendants with both a Travel Act and an
FCPA violation, had avoided the prohibition on convicting and punishing a defend-
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Court decision removing the act of state doctrine from the
FCPA has opened the door to private plaintiffs to question the
acts of foreign sovereigns that relate to FCPA violations.'
Because of the different commands of the FCPA and RICO,
courts are split as to whether a private person or corporation
may bring suit when injured by another party's FCPA viola-
tions. 10 2 Current case law, however, has rejected the FCPA,
ant under two separate crimes for a single criminal act, choosing instead to rely on
the Travel Act. Id. at 338 n.2. Thus, the court noted that the New York bribery
statutes provided an independent basis for a Travel Act violation, which in turn
served as a RICO predicate. Id. at 339. Accordingly, the court in Young & Rubicam
allowed prosecutors to prosecute FCPA violations through RICO, the Travel Act,
conspiracy, and New York bribery statutes without using the FCPA at all. Id. at 342-
45.
United States v. Blondek arose in the criminal context rather than the civil context
of Young & Rubicam. Compare Blondek, 741 F. Supp. 116 with Young & Rubicam, 741 F.
Supp. 334. In Blondek, U.S. prosecutors charged Canadian officials under the FCPA
and U.S. conspiracy statutes. Blondek, 741 F. Supp. at 116. The court determined
that the FCPA did not apply to foreign officials because Congress had intended to
exclude them from the FCPA's reach. Id. at 119-20. In considering the conspiracy
claim, however, the court noted that on its face the general conspiracy statute
reached the foreign officials. Id. at 119. The court nevertheless declined to subject
the officials to the conspiracy statute's reach. Id. at 120.
101. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 701,
706.(1990) (noting that sovereign's motive may be impugned by private U.S. plaintiff
seeking treble damages).
Traditionally, the act of state doctrine bars U.S. courts from inquiring into the
validity of public acts of a foreign government committed within its own territory. See
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250 (1897).
In Environmental Tectonics, the Supreme Court rejected embarrassment of a for-
eign sovereign as grounds for invoking the act of state doctrine. Environmental Tecton-
ics, 110 S. Ct. at 707. The Court noted that it "once viewed the doctrine as an ex-
pression of international law, resting upon 'the highest considerations of interna-
tional comity and expediency' . . . . [but has] more recently described it, however, as
a consequence of domestic separation of powers." Id. at 704 (citations omitted).
The Court endorsed judicial inquiry into both the legality of and the motivation be-
hind a sovereign nation's act. Id. at 705. In addition, the Court rejected comity as a
grounds for invoking the act of state doctrine. Id. at 706; see generally, Note, The Act of
State Doctrine: Reconciling Justice and Diplomacy on a Case-by-Case Basis, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1169, 1179-82 (1989) (discussing Environmental Tectonics); Comment, Interna-
tional Commercial Bribery and the Act of State Doctrine, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 601, 603 (1989);
infra notes 117-26 and accompanying text (discussing Environmental Tectonics).
102. Compare McClean v. Int'l Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1987) (de-
nying private right of action under FCPA) with Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639
(E.D.Ky. 1988) (allowing RICO's application to FCPA violations to create private
right of action).
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standing alone, as providing a private right of action.' 0 3
Civil actions based on FCPA violations generally arise in
two types of cases: those that involve corporate 0 4 or inves-
tor ' 5 injuries, and those that involve "whistleblowers" or em-
103. See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990) (rejecting
private right of action based on FCPA antibribery provisions), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
961 (1991); Eisenberger v. Spectex Indus., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 48 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(refusing private right of action based on FCPA accounting provisions); Lewis ex rel
Nat'l Semiconductor Corp. v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (refusing
private right of action).
In Lamb, the plaintiffs, who were Kentucky tobacco growers, brought antitrust
and FCPA claims against large purchasers of tobacco, alleging that the purchasers
had bribed the President of Venezuela to obtain controls on Venezuelan cigarette
prices. Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1025. The plaintiffs alleged that those price controls artifi-
cially depressed domestic tobacco prices and ensured lucrative retail prices abroad.
Id. The Sixth Circuit applied the Cort v. Ash test to determine whether a private right
of action existed under the FCPA. Id. at 1028; see infra note 159 (discussing Cori v.
Ash test). The Sixth Circuit rejected the notion of a private right of action under the
FCPA alone. Id. at 1030.
In Lewis, a shareholder brought a derivative suit alleging violations of RICO and
the accounting provisions of the FCPA. Lewis, 612 F. Supp. at 1318. The court dis-
missed the RICO claim for failure to allege the proper elements. Id. at 1325-26. The
court held that the accounting provisions of the FCPA did not imply a private right of
action under Cori v. Ash. Id. at 1333-34.
In a shareholder suit similar to Lewis based on violations of the FCPA's account-
ing provisions, Eisenberger v. Spectex Industries, Inc., the court dismissed the RICO claim
for failure to allege the proper elements and disallowed a private right of action.
Eisenberger, 644 F. Supp. 48. The Eisenberger court found that Congress, in enacting
the accounting provisions, did not intend to create a private right of action. Id. at 51.
The court noted that Congress provides for a private remedy when it wishes to do so
and that the FCPA's legislative history emphasizes the sole responsibility of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") in prosecuting civil actions. Id.
104. See, e.g., Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d
404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). In Clayco, the Ninth Circuit
rejected a corporation's argument that the passage of the FCPA signalled Congress's
intent to allow a corporation to bring an action to recover for damages suffered due
to another corporation's bribe of a foreign official. Id. at 409. The Ninth Circuit
based its denial of a private cause of action on the act of state doctrine. Id. at 408-09;
see Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977)
(holding that act of state doctrine precludes examination of foreign sovereign's moti-
vations). But see Note, Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.: Should There
Be A Bribery Exception to the Act of State Doctrine?, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 407 (1984)
(arguing that although Clayco was correctly decided, prior conviction under FCPA
should create exception to act of state doctrine).
105. See, e.g., Sedco Int'l, S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1017 (1982). In Sedco, the Eighth Circuit considered an illicit payment to a for-
eign official that took place after the FCPA had been enacted, but before it became
effective. Id. at 1203. The court allowed an investor who had been defrauded in a
scheme involving the illicit payment to recover the money that he had loaned to the
venture. Id. at 1204.
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ployees fired for a refusal to participate in or conceal a foreign
bribery scheme. 106 Currently, courts allow private actions in
cases of FCPA violations where plaintiffs seek recovery from
the bribing party for behavior other than a bare FCPA viola-
tion. For example, courts have granted parties standing to
bring a private right of action under antitrust law against com-
petitors alleging that they lost a contract due to an illegal for-
eign bribery scheme.° 7 Also, under antitrust law, a producer
may bring an action against a buyer who bribes a foreign offi-
cial to obtain price controls in that country. 0 In addition,
under common law claims of fraud, a defrauded investor may
seek restitution of money that he loaned to a corporation en-
gaged in a fraudulent scheme involving foreign bribery.'0 9
A complaint pleading civil RICO claims based solely on
FCPA violations, however, may allow a private action."10
Courts applying civil RICO to FCPA violations generally as-
sume without question that civil RICO, according to its ex-
press language, provides a private right of action when a for-
eign official is bribed.' After accepting the assumption that a
private right of action exists, however, courts disagree as to
what party may exercise that right. 1 2 Accordingly, many anal-
yses of civil RICO's application to FCPA violations both start
and stop at the question of the party's standing to bring an
action. 3
In applying civil RICO to an FCPA violation, courts limit
standing by requiring a showing of "causation," that is, that
the plaintiff was injured "by reason of" the defendant's FCPA
violation." 4 In the corporate context, an assertion in the
106. See, e.g., Nodine v. Textron, 819 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1987) (involving RICO
suit by employee-plaintiff who was fired for reporting FCPA violations).
107. See Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mich.
1981).
108. See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
Ill S. Ct. 961 (1991).
109. See Sedco Int'l, S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1982).
110. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). Courts have allowed a private right of
action for FCPA violations under the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Sage, 534 F. Supp. 896.
111. See, e.g., Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347, 348-49 (1st Cir. 1987) (as-
suming civil RICO provides private right of action but denying plaintiff standing).
112. See, e.g., id.
113. See id. at 348-49.
114. See Nodine, 819 F.2d 347 (holding that whistleblower has no RICO standing
to sue for discharge due to refusal to participate in FCPA violation). But see Williams
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pleadings that the plaintiff corporation was in competition for
a particular contract that the defendant won through bribes
may suffice to confer RICO standing and allege causation."'
A pleading merely stating that another party who was engaged
in a common transaction made unauthorized payments to offi-
cials of a foreign government may, however, be insufficient for
lack of particularity. "16
Environmental Tectonics Corporation, International v. W. S. Kirk-
patrick & Company"t 7 involved a civil RICO action brought on
underlying FCPA violations by a competitor corporation." 8 In
Environmental Tectonics, the Environmental Tectonics Corpora-
tion (the "ETC"), a manufacturer of aircraft equipment and
facilities, brought an action for damages against its competitor,
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Company ("Kirkpatrick"), alleging that
Kirkpatrick had won a Nigerian defense contract by bribing
Nigerian officials.' In its complaint against Kirkpatrick, ETC
pled violations of RICO, the New Jersey Anti-Racketeering
Act, and the Robinson Patman Act.' 20 The U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey dismissed the case on act of state
doctrine grounds.' 2 ' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (1988) (whistleblower has RICO standing to recover for
discharge because of refusal to participate in FCPA violations).
115. See Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d
1052, 1067 (3d Cir. 1988), af'd, 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990).
116. Cf Citicorp Int'l Trading Co. v. Western Oil & Ref. Co., No. 88 Civ. 5377,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 450, at 13 (S.D.N.Y.Jan. 16, 1991) (dismissing FCPA claim for
lack of particularity with leave to replead).
117. 659 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.J. 1987), rev'd, 847 F. 2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988), afd,
110 S. Ct. 701 (1990).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1386.
120. See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1988); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-2 (1982). ETC
alleged that Kirkpatrick bribed the Nigerian officials through Panamanian subsidiar-
ies it had established for that purpose. Environmental Tectonics, 659 F. Supp. at 1381.
ETC based its claim on Kirkpatrick's guilty plea to FCPA violations. Id. at 1387.
121. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 659 F. Supp
1381, 1402 (D.NJ. 1987), rev'd, 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 701
(1990). The U.S. Department of State expressed approval of the suit in a letter to the
court. See id. at 1402-03 (app. A) ("If the adjudication of this suit were to involve a
judicial inquiry into the motivations of the Government of Nigeria's decision to
award the contract, the Department does not believe the act of state doctrine would
bar the Court from adjudicating this dispute"). The court reasoned that the inquiry
would embarrass the Nigerian government and hinder the executive's foreign policy
powers since the executive did not control the timing of the decision, and would
constitute an unconstitutional delegation of executive power to the judicial branch.
See id. at 1391-98. The court noted, however, that "the amended complaint pleads
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Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal on act of state
grounds and remanded the case for trial, holding that ETC had
standing to bring a civil RICO action against Kirkpatrick. 22
In W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics,12 3 the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Third Circuit decision, finding
that the act of state doctrine does not bar a suit that questions
the motivation of foreign officials. 124 The Court held that a
court may invoke the act of state doctrine only where adjudica-
tion would require a U.S. court to declare invalid the official
act of a foreign sovereign performed on its own territory. 125
The U.S. Supreme Court did not disturb the Third Circuit's
determination that ETC's allegations of Kirkpatrick's FCPA vi-
olations fulfilled civil RICO's requirements of pleading an in-
jury and a "pattern" of racketeering activity.' 2 6
In the whistleblower context, courts similarly have re-
ETC's injury sufficiently to survive these motions to dismiss." Id. at 1389. The Dis-
trict court did, however, dismiss the RICO and New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Statute
Act claims for failure to set forth the requisite "pattern of racketeering activity." Id.
at 1391 & n.8; see supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing Environmental
Tectonics).
122. See Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d
Cir. 1988), affid, 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990). The court premised its holding on the act of
state doctrine and its basis in separation of powers. Id. at 1061-62. The court noted
that "the Department [of State]'s factual assessment of whether fulfillment of its re-
sponsibilities will be prejudiced by the course of civil litigation is entitled to substan-
tial respect." Id. at 1062. The court dismissed the potential embarrassment to the
Nigerian government as speculative. Id. at 1061.
123. 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 705. The Court added that
[aict of state issues only arise when a court must decide-that is, when the
outcome of the case turns upon-the effect of official action by a foreign
sovereign. When that question is not in the case, neither is the act of state
doctrine.... Regardless of what the court's factual findings may suggest as
to the legality of the Nigerian contract, its legality is simply not a question to
be decided in the present suit, and there is thus no occasion to apply the
rule of decision that the act of state doctrine requires.
Id. (emphasis in original). It is unclear, however, whether the Court intended to bar
the doctrine's invocation in instances where the executive branch opposes resolution
of the controversy or where the controversy involves sensitive national matters. Id. at
706.
126. See Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d
1052, 1064 (3d Cir. 1988), affd, 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990). The Third Circuit had deter-
mined that although ETC's complaint alleged only one bribe paid in four install-
ments, the complexity of the payment scheme satisfied RICO. Id. at 1063-64. The
Third Circuit also based its determination that RICO's pattern requirement had been
fulfilled on Kirkpatrick's hiring of an agent, the victimization of the citizens of Nige-
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jected actions brought under the FCPA alone.'2 7 Courts are
divided, however, as to the propriety of allowing an employee
to recover for injuries stemming from FCPA violations by
bringing civil RICO claims.' 2 8 Courts differ as to whether the
employee's injuries must flow directly from the employer's vio-
lation for the employee to have standing to bring suit under
civil RICO. 29 Some courts require the employee to show that
the dismissal was an essential part of the bribery scheme.'30 In
contrast, a court may require an employee to show only the
employee's involuntarily inclusion in a conspiracy to bribe a
foreign official, and the employee's refusal to continue in the
conspiracy that caused the wrongful dismissal.' 3 '
In Reddy v. Litton Industries, Inc. the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit rejected an employee's suit on standing
grounds.' 32 The Reddy court considered a summary dismissal
of an employee's wrongful termination action.' 3 3  The em-
ployee claimed violations of RICO predicated on the em-
ployer's alleged violation of the FCPA. t1 4 During his employ-
ment, plaintiff Reddy allegedly uncovered a bribery scheme in-
ria, and the victimization of U.S. citizens through the diminution of U.S. stature. Id.
at 1063-64.
127. See, e.g., McClean v. Int'l Harvester, Co., 817 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1987). In
McClean, International Harvester, McClean's employer, pled guilty to violations of
the FCPA in connection with the purchase of turbines from Mexico, and in its offer of
proof alleged that McClean had violated the FCPA. Id. McClean brought suit, alleg-
ing that International Harvester acted in collusion with the Department of Justice to
make him the "scapegoat" of its bribery scheme, which he argued gave him a cause of
action under the Eckhardt Amendment to the FCPA's antibribery provisions. Id. at
1219. The court, basing its decision on the factors enunciated in Cort v. Ash, rejected
McClean's claim. Id. at 1219. Although the Eckhardt Amendment, which Congress
has since repealed, provided that an employee could not be held liable for FCPA
violations unless his corporate employer had already been convicted, courts continue
to rely on the McClean decision. See, e.g., Citicorp Int'l Trading Co. v. Western Oil &
Ref. Co., No. 88 Civ. 5377, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 450 (1991) (noting McClean with
approval).
128. Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing
split in authority on RICO standing in whistleblower cases); see supra note 98 and
accompanying text (noting split in authority on granting RICO standing to termi-
nated employees).
129. See Reddy, 912 F.2d at 295.
130. See id. at 295.
131. See, e.g., Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (granting stand-
ing based on involuntary inclusion in conspiracy).
132. Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990).
133. Id. at 293.
134. Id.
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
volving Litton Industries, Inc. ("Litton") and Saudi Arabian
defense officials.'1 5 After Litton dismissed the plaintiff for re-
porting the scheme to his superiors, he sued, claiming that the
dismissal came as a result of his disclosure of the bribery
scheme.13 6 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of Reddy's RICO claims with prejudice on standing
grounds and remanded his pendent claims to state court.3 7
The court noted that "the act of terminating Reddy's employ-
ment is not a predicate act as defined by § 1961 (1) [of RICO],
nor was that act essential to the alleged conspiracy between
Litton and the Saudi Arabian officials."' 3 8 The Ninth Circuit's
decision contained no analysis of the FCPA.
The plaintiff's spectacular recovery in Williams v. Hall'19
illustrates the large stakes involved in civil RICO wrongful ter-
mination actions based on FCPA violations. 40 The employees
alleged that for several years Ashland Oil, Inc. ("Ashland")
conducted the procurement phase of its operations in part by
illegally bribing officials of Middle Eastern countries, in viola-
tion of the FCPA. 14  Plaintiffs further alleged that when they
refused to participate in the FCPA violations, Ashland dis-
charged them. 142 In formulating their claim, plaintiffs alleged
that Ashland was an enterprise operated through a pattern of
racketeering activity.143 The court recognized that the employ-
ees would be able to recover under state law, but that allowing
the RICO claim would augment the plaintiffs' recovery with
treble damages and attorney's fees. 14 4 The court focused ex-
clusively on RICO's liberal construction language without con-
sidering the language or purpose of FCPA and allowed the ac-
135. Id. at 292.
136. Id. at 293.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 295.
139. 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
140. See id.; Sella, More Big Bucks in Jury Verdict: Additions to the 1988 List, 75
A.B.A. J. 69, 70 (July 1989). The court awarded the plaintiff US$69,515,367. Id.
141. Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639, 640 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
142. Id.
143. Id. The complaint contained allegations of multiple RICO predicate acts,
such as wire fraud, mail fraud, and travelling in interstate and foreign commerce to
deliver the bribes in violation of the Travel Act. Id. The plaintiffs also alleged securi-
ties fraud in that false financial statements were filed with the SEC and distributed to
investors. Id.
144. Id. at 641.
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tion. 14 5
Reddy and Williams illustrate the inconsistent results arising
from applications of civil RICO to FCPA violations.' 46 They
further illustrate that courts assume that civil RICO provides a
private right of action in cases of FCPA violations, and do not
examine congressional intent in enacting the FCPA to provide
such actions. 47 The inquiry of both courts begins with the
question of whether the plaintiff has suffered an injury due to
the FCPA violation. 48 Williams correctly reasons that an em-
ployee injured by a refusal to participate in a conspiracy has
suffered damages due to that refusal.149 Reddy's finding that an
employee involuntarily included in a bribery conspiracy is not
injured by his disclosure of the conspiracy and subsequent dis-
charge is incorrect. 5 ° Reddy ignores the common law of con-
spiracy whereby a person who has knowledge of the conspiracy
must act affirmatively to disengage from that conspiracy to
avoid liability for the acts of that conspiracy.' 5' In addition,
Reddy ignores that the discharge was an act in furtherance of
that conspiracy.' 52 Accordingly, if civil RICO applies to FCPA
violations, results like Williams should be commonplace.
III. COURTS SHOULD NOT READ CIVIL RICO TO ALLOW
A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR FCPA
VIOLATIONS
Congress did not intend the FCPA to provide a private
right of action. 53 Congress did not enact civil RICO to priva-
tize U.S. foreign policy. 54 Moreover, allowing private civil
RICO actions based on an FCPA violation effectively would re-
145. Id. at 642.
146. Compare Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1990)
(denying RICO standing) with Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988)
(granting RICO standing).
147. Reddy, 912 F.2d at 293-96; Williams, 683 F. Supp. at 640-44.
148. Reddy, 912 F.2d at 295; Williams, 683 F. Supp. at 643.
149. See Williams, 683 F. Supp. at 644 (analyzing conspiracy law).
150. See Reddy, 912 F.2d at 295 (finding that employee not injured "by reason
of" FCPA violation).
151. See, e.g., Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946) (outlining common
law doctrine of conspiracy).
152. Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 291 (9th Cir. 1990).
153. See supra note 30 (discussing Congress's repeated refusals to enact amend-
ment to FCPA providing for private right of action).
154. See supra notes 75-97 (discussing congressional intent in enacting RICO).
1990-1991] FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
peal major provisions of the FCPA both as enacted and as
amended. 5 5
A. Implication Doctrine. A Framework for Analysis of Congressional
Policy with Respect to Private Civil RICO Actions for
FCPA Violations
Where Congress enacts a criminal statute, but fails to pro-
vide an accompanying private right of action to protect parties
injured due to violations of that statute, a court may allow such
a remedy if the court determines that, in enacting the statute,
Congress intended injured parties to have redress. 156 The
U.S. Supreme Court, in Cort v. Ash,' 57 developed an analysis to
determine whether a statute implies a private right of action.'
The Cort v. Ash factors provide a useful analytical tool to high-
light the fundamental inconsistency of a private civil RICO ac-
tion and the FCPA's statutory construction.' 5 9
The Cort v. Ash test consists of four elements for determin-
ing whether a federal statute implies a private right of ac-
tion.'6 First, is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose
155. See supra notes 31-74 (discussing Congress's objectives in amending the
FCPA).
156. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (analyzing availa-
bility of private right of action).
157. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
158. See id. at 78.
159. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see also Note, The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977: A Private Right of Action?, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735 (1979)
(applying Cort v. Ash analysis to the FCPA). The McClean court used the Cort v. Ash
test to determine whether the FCPA implies a private right of action. See McClean v.
Int'l Harvester, 817 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying Cort v. Ash to Eckhardt
Amendment, formerly part of FCPA antibribery provisions); Siegel, supra note 30, at
1104-17 (applying Cort v. Ash analysis to FCPA). The Cori v. Ash analysis is appropri-
ate where a court is unable to ascertain a clear congressional intent to either grant or
preclude a private cause of action. Id. at 1096.
The Cort v. Ash test has also determined the denial of private rights of action
under the FCPA's accounting provisions. See Eisenberger v. Spectex Indus., Inc., 644
F. Supp. 48 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1985). In
Lewis v. Sporck, the legislative history of the FCPA did not provide for a private right
of action, either explicitly or implicitly. 612 F. Supp. 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1985). The
Lewis court searched the FCPA's legislative history, analyzed the legal context of the
FCPA's enactment, and found no affirmative congressional intent to create a private
right of action. Id. In analyzing whether Congress implicitly intended to create a
private right of action, the court inferred a lack of intent from the FCPA's delegation
of enforcement authority to the SEC and the Department ofJustice (the "DOJ"). Id.
160. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
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especial benefit Congress enacted the statute to create a fed-
eral right?' 6 ' Second, is there any indication of legislative in-
tent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or deny
one? 62 Third, is the remedy consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such an action? 63
Fourth, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of
action based solely on federal law?" 6 An analysis of these fac-
tors clearly illustrates that not only did Congress not intend a
private right of action in drafting the FCPA, but also that al-
lowing a private civil RICO action to effectuate the same rem-
edy would subvert the FCPA's statutory framework and poli-
cies.
1. Congressional Intent to Create a Remedy
Many courts treat the issue of whether Congress intended
to allow a private action, the second prong of the Cort v. Ash
test, as dispositive.' 65 The FCPA's antibribery provisions con-
tain penal sanctions.' 66 In the case of a statute that contains
penal sanctions but no private cause of action, a court may im-
ply the additional remedy of a private cause of action despite
its absence from the statute only if Congress clearly intended
to create such an action.' 67 No such clear intent was evident in
the enactment of the FCPA in 1977,168 nor did any such intent
become apparent during the FCPA's lengthy amendment pro-
cess. 1
6 9





165. See, e.g., Temengil v. Trust Territory of Pac. Islands, 881 F.2d 647, 653 n.8
(9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2617 (1990).
166. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g) (1988).
167. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
168. See Siegel, supra note 30, at 1104-13. But see, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1,701 (reprinting SEC opinion that FCPA implies private cause
of action).
169. See supra notes 38-74 and accompanying text (discussing FCPA amend-
ments).
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1988 shows a strong contrary policy.' 7t In amending the
FCPA, Congress'provided severe, but clearly-defined civil and
criminal penalties coupled with amendments that sought to
limit corporate liability and enhance U.S. competitiveness.' 7 '
The amendments' exceptions for facilitating payments, al-
lowing the affirmative defenses of legality and reasonableness,
and providing for a review letter procedure, are designed to be
enforced solely under the discretion of an executive agency
able to evaluate, in confidence, the propriety of a payment
without causing international tensions.' 72
Congress's careful balance of preventive and punitive ele-
ments embodied in the FCPA's plain language would be dis-
rupted by a private litigant able to precipitate the matter
before the Securities and Exchange Commission had com-
pleted its investigations. 73 In addition, the provisions of "rea-
sonableness" and "legality" as affirmative defenses that place
the burden of proof on the defendant make sense only in the
context of a Securities and Exchange Commission or Depart-
ment of Justice proceeding; applying such standards to a pri-
vate action would put corporations in the burdensome position
of having to prove the reasonableness of their actions to com-
petitors. While Congress recognized the need for punishment
and enforceability, Congress took great care to define prohib-
ited payments and the corresponding penalties.' 74 During the
process of amending the FCPA, Congress tried to enhance the
competitiveness of U.S. corporations and limit their liability in
170. See supra notes 31-63 and accompanying text (discussing congressional
aims in amending FCPA).
171. See supra notes 38-74 (discussing FCPA amendments).
172. See, e.g., Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1322 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (dis-
cussing importance of executive discretion). But see W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envi-
ronmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990) (noting that embarrassment
of foreign sovereign not concern of U.S. courts). The exceptions for legality and
reasonableness and the affirmative defenses lend themselves to SEC or DQJ investi-
gation, rather than to private litigation's awkward tool of extraterritorial discovery.
See infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text (discussing enforcement difficulties due
to foreign situs of FCPA enforcement).
173. See Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Officials: Hearings on S. 3133, S. 3379 and S.
3418 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976); Unlawful Corporate Payments: Hearings on H.R. 3815 and H.R. 1602 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
174. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (describing FCPA's prohibition of
certain payments and corresponding penalties).
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engaging in overseas operations. 175 Allowing a private civil
RICO action for an FCPA violation would undermine Con-
gress's intent to limit corporate liability. 176
Moreover, Congress rejected several proposals that con-
tained private rights of action.177 It also rejected treble dam-
ages for both governmental civil actions and private litiga-
tion.' 78 Congress did not intend that the judiciary inquire into
whether a foreign government official's receipt of a payment
was facilitating, corrupt, or reasonable at the behest of a pri-
vate plaintiff lured by the prospect of treble damages. 179 Ac-
cordingly, Congress intended no private rights of action in the
case of an FCPA violation-an intention that a private civil
RICO action would subvert.
2. Creation of a Federal Right in a Subclass of Plaintiffs
An analysis of the first Cort v. Ash factor, whether Congress
enacted the statute for the plaintiff's especial benefit or to cre-
ate a federal right in the plaintiff, further highlights the degree
to which a civil RICO action clashes with the FCPA's pur-
poses.' 8 0 Congress enacted the FCPA to protect the executive
branch's ability to conduct foreign policy, to prevent the recur-
rence of foreign bribery scandals, and to protect U.S. competi-
tiveness abroad, not to create a federal right in favor of a par-
ticular subclass. 18 ' The FCPA's amendment process was a tug
of war between defenders of national morality on one side, and
defenders of national competitiveness on the other-neither
175. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text (discussing congressional ef-
forts to enhance U.S. competitiveness and limit corporate liability).
176. See supra notes 31-54 and accompanying text (outlining reasons for FCPA's
1988 amendments).
177. S. 3379, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 9, 10, 122 CONG. REC. 12,604 (1976)
(containing federal proposal for FCPA private right of action).
178. Id.
179. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (outlining Congress's disapproval
of FCPA private right of action).
180. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (citing Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby,
241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
181. See Siegel, supra note 30, at 1114 (noting that in enacting FCPA, Congress
sought to provide protection for nation and economy as a whole, not competitors);
supra notes 9-30 and accompanying text (discussing congressional goals in enacting
FCPA).
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group interested in protecting a particular subclass. 82 In fact,
the corporate subclass that could claim a federal right, those
injured by a corporation obtaining a contract through bribery,
already has federal antitrust laws available to remedy practices
involving unfair competition or abuses of market power.1s3
While all U.S. citizens generally may claim that the FCPA pro-
tects their interests, private domestic plaintiffs do not fit into
the recognizable subclass that Cort v. Ash requires."8 4
3. Consistency of the Remedy with the Legislative Purpose
The third factor determining whether a statute implies a
private right of action is whether the remedy is necessary to
effect, and is consistent with, the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme. 8 5 The purposes Congress intended to ef-
fectuate in enacting the FCPA, elimination of slush funds and
provision of enforcement powers to government agencies,
would not be appreciably enhanced by allowing a private right
of action, except, perhaps, as an added deterrent. 8 6 Con-
gress, in amending the FCPA, expressed its satisfaction with
the FCPA's deterrent effect on corporate bribery of foreign of-
ficials; it chose, rather, to make FCPA compliance less costly,
to limit corporate liability and to provide corporations with be-
havioral guidelines. 8 7 Accordingly, the argument that a pri-
182. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S4657, S4664 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1988) (statement
of Sen. Proxmire calling Omnibus Trade Act the "Bring Back Bribery Bill").
183. See, e.g., Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990) (deny-
ing private right of action under FCPA, but allowing antitrust claims based on pay-
ment of bribes), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 961 (1991).
184. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 79. The Court noted that
[elvery criminal statute is designed to protect some individual, public, or
social interest.... To find an implied civil cause of action for the plaintiff in
this case is to find an implied civil right of action for every individual, social,
or public interest which might be invaded by violation of any criminal stat-
ute. To do this is to conclude that Congress intended to enact a civil code
companion to the criminal code.
Id., quoting Cort v. Ash, 496 F.2d 416, 428-29 (3d Cir. 1974) (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
The FCPA, however, provides for civil enforcement by the SEC. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-2 (d)-(f) (1988).
185. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281, 317 (1979) (private right of action not necessary to make effective congressional
purpose in Trade Secrets Act).
186. See supra notes 9-30 and accompanying text (describing Congress's pur-
poses in enacting FCPA).
187. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text (discussing congressional ef-
forts to enhance U.S. competitiveness and limit corporate liability).
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vate right of action should exist on deterrence grounds fails.
Furthermore, not only is a civil RICO action unnecessary
to effectuate the FCPA's purposes, but the allowance of such
actions might hinder effective government investigation and
enforcement and interfere with Executive Branch foreign pol-
icy powers. Private civil RICO actions would subvert the
FCPA's limitation of enforcement actions to executive branch
proceedings, open inquiries into areas of foreign policy, and
apply U.S. law to acts occurring in foreign countries.' 8 The
FCPA's designation of the U.S. Department of Justice and the
Securities and Exchange Commission as the sole enforcement
authorities would thus be repealed by allowing a private civil
RICO action.' 8 9 Finally, allowing private civil RICO actions
would increase the costs and liability involved in an FCPA vio-
lation, in direct contravention of the streamlining effect that
Congress intended the 1988 amendments to have.' 9 0
Congress prescribed severe, but limited, financial penal-
ties and prison terms for FCPA violations.' 9 ' Private civil
RICO litigation effectively would repeal this statutory scheme
by exposing corporations to enormous financial liability: any
competing corporation that lost a contract due to a foreign
bribe could seek damages for the entire amount of the con-
tract. 1
92
4. Availability of State Remedies
The fourth Cort v. Ash factor is whether the cause of action
is one traditionally relegated to state law so that it would be
188. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (outlining concerns underlying
act of state doctrine).
189. See S. REP. No. 486, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 19 (views of Sen. Proxmire); see
also Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir.
1983) (noting that judicial interference hinders foreign policy), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1040 (1984).
190. See 122 CoNG. REC. 30,421 (1976) (statement of Senator Percy) (private
right of action would merely produce legal harassment, rather than effective enforce-
ment, and increase consumer and legal costs); see Letter from Secretary of Commerce
Elliot L. Richardson to Senator John Tower (Sept. 15, 1976), reprinted in 122 CONG.
REC. 30,419 (opposing treble damages in private action).
191. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(l) & (2) (1988).
192. See Amendment No. 2292, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 30,333
(1976) (amendment rejected by Congress proposing private right of action for com-
petitors).
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inappropriate to infer an action solely based on federal law.' 93
This factor focuses on the availability of an adequate state
court remedy. 194
This inquiry is relevant where an employee plaintiff ques-
tions not the acts of a sovereign, a federal concern, but rather
an employer's decision to fire him, a traditional state con-
cern.'9 The actions upon which the employee based his claim,
the actual bribery of a sovereign power, could be challenged
under state law for breach of fiduciary duty.' 96 State law may
also provide a right of action for wrongful termination.' 9 7 As
wrongful termination is traditionally a state law concern, a
whistleblower case provides no occasion to create a federal
remedy to supplant a traditional state concern.'98
B. Civil RICO's Application to FCPA Violations Stretches Civil
RICO Beyond Congress's Intent
Although the FCPA does not create private rights that
Congress intended to protect, courts have recently allowed
private rights of action through RICO's civil provisions based
upon FCPA violations.' 99 RICO is a remedial statute that Con-
gress created to enable prosecutors to attack organized crime
193. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
194. See Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1333 (D.C. Cal. 1985).
195. See, e.g., Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
196. Id.; see D'Agostino v. Johnson &Johnson, Inc., 225 N.J. Super. 250, 542
A.2d 44 (1988) (allowing employee state remedy in case of wrongful. termination re-
lated to FCPA violation), aftd, 115 NJ. 491, 559 A.2d 420 (1990).
197. See Williams, 683 F. Supp. at 641; see also D'Agostino, 225 N.J. Super. at 250,
542 A.2d at 44.
198. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84-85 (1975). The Court insisted on the
states' right to regulate corporate affairs, stating that
except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of direc-
tors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of
the corporation. ... We are necessarily reluctant to imply a federal right to
recover funds used in violation of a federal statute where the laws governing
the corporation may put a shareholder on notice that there may be no such
recovery.
Id.
199. See, e.g., Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.,
847 F. 2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988) (allowing civil RICO action for FCPA violation), aff'd,
110 S. Ct. 170 (1990); Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford Enters., Inc., 826 F.2d 392
(5th Cir. 1987) (allowing civil RICO action for FCPA violation); Williams v. Hall, 683
F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (allowing civil RICO action for FCPA violation).
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for illegal behavior not adequately punished.20 0 Congress cre-
ated civil RICO and its treble damages award as a supplement
to enlist private resources in its domestic war on organized
crime, a war that Congress believed public prosecutorial re-
sources were insufficient to handle.2 0 ' Neither rationale for
the application of civil RICO-lack of adequate punishment or
lack of enforcement resources-exists in the FCPA context.
Accordingly, allowing private civil RICO actions runs counter
to Congress's intent in enacting RICO and its civil counter-
part.20 2
Congress designed the FCPA, like RICO, to fill a
prosecutorial gap in federal and state penal codes.20 3 Both
statutes replace creative prosecutorial uses of the mail and wire
fraud statutes.2 0 4 RICO now enhances the penalties of those
statutes, °5 and the FCPA relies on them for jurisdictional pur-
poses.20 6 Both the FCPA and RICO carry strong penalties. °7
The statutes differ in that Congress enacted the FCPA to fill a
specific gap in the law: that of penalties a party would incur by
bribing a foreign official.208 Congress enacted RICO to apply
to statutory gaps in general. 20 9 The FCPA's specific prohibi-
tion of bribing a foreign official and the corresponding penal-
ties cover the problem of foreign bribery; in amending the
FCPA without adding a private right of action, Congress ac-
200. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of RICO
statute).
201. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of RICO
statute).
202. See 122 CONG. REc. 30,336 (1976) (statement of Sen. Percy) (warning that
private right of action would cause legal harassment and would not enhance enforce-
ment).
203. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing FCPA objective of pro-
viding effective prosecutorial tool).
204. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutorial reliance
on mail and wire fraud statutes in cases of pre-FCPA briberies of foreign officials);
supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutorial reliance on mail
and wire fraud statutes in pre-RICO actions against organized crime).
205. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (discussing RICO's basis in
multiple acts of mail and wire fraud).
206. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting RICO's Commerce Clause
jurisdictional predicate).
207. See supra note 25 (discussing FCPA penalties) and note 87 (discussing
RICO penalties).
208. The FCPA deals specifically with the problem of foreign bribery. See supra
notes 9-25 and accompanying text (discussing FCPA's purposes and structure).
209. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
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knowledged that prosecutorial efforts had the desired deter-
rent effect without the private right of action.
Furthermore, RICO's attack on enterprise criminality is
redundant in light of the FCPA's target: enterprises engaging
in criminal conduct. Congress's intent that RICO have a "re-
medial" purpose argues strongly in favor of not applying
RICO in the FCPA context where a remedy is strong, nar-
rowly-tailored, effective and recently addressed by Con-
gress.2 ° The net effect of allowing civil RICO actions based
on FCPA violations would be to expand civil liability far be-
yond the criminal liability that Congress intended to impose
when it enacted RICO. 21 '
When Congress takes time to isolate offensive conduct
and to impose prohibitions on that conduct, as it did in enact-
ing and amending the FCPA, the judiciary should not rewrite
legislative efforts by applying the broad RICO statutes to pro-
hibit conduct that Congress did not expressly proscribe.21
Applying civil RICO in the FCPA context reverts to the
bludgeons of mail and wire fraud to criminalize acts that the
FCPA was designed to regulate. Inherent in a corporation's
bribery of a foreign official are the components of that act: the
use of the mails and other tools of interstate commerce, and
the use and investment of the proceeds. Foreign bribery, by its
nature, is ongoing, continuous, and related, even in the case of
a one-time payment-automatically fulfilling RICO's pattern
requirements. 21 3 The FCPA prohibits such behavior and sets
out specific penalties for violations. 214  RICO's application
would not only duplicate the FCPA's role, but it would also
subvert the FCPA's basic policy objectives of corporate gui-
dance, limitation of liability, and competitiveness.
210. Cf Note, supra note 87, at 1292-1301 (arguing that civil RICO is punitive in
nature and should be accompanied by safeguards available in criminal proceedings).
211. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Department's
narrow interpretation of availability of RICO remedy).
212. Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act Joint Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Securities and the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on S. 708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 433
(1981) (statement of Harvey L. Pitt); see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235
n.20 (1980).
213. See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1989)
(outlining requirements for RICO pattern).
214. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2 & 78ff (1988).
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The FCPA takes much care to define the requisite scienter
and the type of payment that violate the statute.21 5 For exam-
ple, Congress intended to exempt facilitating payments from
the FCPA's prohibition.2 t6 Such payments might violate the
mail fraud statute, which contains broader language and has a
lower scienter requirement.21 7 Payments deemed reasonable
and bona fide are also legal.21 8 Only payments "corruptly"
made to influence an official in his official capacity are
bribes. t9
Application of the mail fraud statute would prohibit pay-
ments that Congress chose to exempt from the FCPA's
reach.22 0 A civil RICO action based on more than one viola-
tion of the mail fraud statute would bypass Congress's enforce-
ment structure and impose greater penalties for the same con-
duct that the FCPA prohibits. 2
RICO is unquestionably more effective at taking the profit
out of the proscribed activity, as its aim is to destroy a criminal
organization.2 2 The FCPA has the gentler mission of stop-
ping corporate misbehavior while preserving the operations on
which the domestic economy and employment depend. This
mission is consistent with the modem notion that individuals
running large corporations are no longer merely manipulating
their personal wealth, but acting as trustees for the pension
funds and municipalities which have an increasingly large stake
in those enterprises. On the contrary, RICO was designed to
destroy the nominally legitimate enterprises used as shields for
corruption. Moreover, the FCPA specifically sets out large fi-
215. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (outlining FCPA scienter re-
quirement).
216. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b)(1988); see supra note 58 (defining routine govern-
mental action).
217. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
218. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (outlining FCPA, exception for
reasonable payments).
219. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (defining "corrupt payment").
220. See supra note 5 (discussing reach of mail fraud statute); supra notes 51-55
(discussing exceptions and affirmative defenses contained in 1988 FCPA amend-
ments).
221. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988) (providing for maximum twenty-year prison
term and mandatory forfeiture provisions to extent of violator's holding under
RICO).
222. See supra note 75-77 and accompanying text (describing RICO's purpose).
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nancial penalties and stiff prison terms to punish violations, 2
whereas allowing private litigants to collect civil RICO's treble
damages would create limitless corporate liability.22 4
Reading civil RICO to allow a private right of action
would assume that Congress was unaware that bribery has a
profit motive when it drafted the FCPA's penalty scheme. Be-
cause Congress did take the FCPA violator's profit motive into
account, civil RICO fails to serve a remedial purpose in the
context of foreign bribes. Civil RICO's basic remedial purpose
is to enlist private litigants to combat pattern criminality and
the corruption of legitimate enterprises. 2 5 The FCPA's provi-
sions take into account that (1) a corporation is a legitimate
enterprise and (2) that the corporation would be corruptly
used if its agents bribed foreign officials, since the FCPA pro-
226hibits "corrupt" payments.
C. Problems Stemming from the FCPA's Enforcement Forum
The FCPA is a statute that regulates behavior the purpose
or consummation of which usually takes place outside the
United States. 27 In order for the FCPA to reach its target,
namely, those who bribe foreign officials, the bribe must first
be proved. The cross-border nature of FCPA jurisdiction and
enforcement, where the judgment forum is a U.S. court, poses
a variety of problems for both corporate228 and individual2 29
223. See supra note 25 (discussing FCPA penalties).
224. See Lynch, supra note 77, at 752. This commentator has noted that
the forfeiture provisions of RICO carry the possibility of financial sanctions
that are both mandatory, because the judge has no discretion to moderate
or remit a RICO forefeiture, and possibly draconian, since the extent of the
forfeiture may be measured by the value of the defendant's interest in the
enterprise rather than by the extent of the criminal conduct or profits there-
from.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
225. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of civil
RICO).
226. See supra notes 20-25 (discussing payments prohibited by FCPA).
227. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I & 78dd-2 (1988) (prohibiting bribery of foreign offi-
cials without geographic restriction).
228. For example, Congress expressed concern with limiting the scope of en-
forcement actions in its decision to leave foreign subsidiaries out of the text of the
FCPA. 123 CONG. REC. 38,778 (1977) (statement of Rep. Devine).
229. Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 3815 and H.R.
1602 before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 229
(1977). In his discussion with Harold M. Williams, SEC Chairman, and Harvey Pitt,
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defendants. Judicial imposition of liability on one who bribes
necessarily casts the alleged recipient in an unfavorable light-
with particularly unfortunate consequences for the foreign offi-
cial.23 ° In the FCPA context, a private civil RICO action would
allow a private party to activate the judicial machinery against a
foreign official, thereby possibly convicting the foreign official
without affording him due process protections. Fidelity to the
FCPA delegation of enforcement power to the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission
would ensure that the foreign official does not suffer embar-
rassment before a proper case had been made.
A private civil RICO action for an FCPA violation also in-
creases the risk that U.S. courts inquire into areas barred by
the act of state doctrine. The FCPA's delegation of enforce-
ment powers to the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the U.S. Department of Justice limits such inquiries according
SEC general counsel, subcommittee chairman Eckhardt presented the following con-
cerns relating to the individual defendant in a foreign forum:
1. In a prosecution of a corporation's action overseas, the defendant would
be in a position to produce what evidence there was to contradict any con-
tention that the company had anything to do with the bribery, but an indi-
vidual agent faced with a similar charge where the totality of proof would be
overseas would not be in the same position, and his interest would be in
conflict with those of the corporation;
2. It may be in a foreign government's interest to prove that the defendant
agent did, without authorization, bribe a lower-level official, in order to re-
move the matter from political concern; the corporation may want to aid in
showing violations for similar reasons; the agent becomes the Sacrificial
Lamb who shifts the focus of the public eye away from the corporation and
the government;
3. An individual can be put in jail while a corporation can't-making the
stakes of winning much higher for the individual;
4. An individual would already be vulnerable to the law of the nation where
the act occurred;
5. Geographic and evidentiary burdens would be great on the defendant
who is brought to the United States, his witnesses would be halfway around
the world-a disadvantage usually allowed only in the extraordinary cases
like airplane hijacking;
6. A corporation's common defense would be that it knows nothing about
the bribery, putting its interests directly at odds with those of the agent;
7. The agent would be protected by the issuer in at least those cases where
the issuer chooses to contest the violation;
8. The heavy burden of proof placed on the individual would deny him due
process.
Id.
230. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing impact of bribery scan-
dals on foreign officials).
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to executive branch discretion.23' Congress drew this limita-
tion to reach its goal of leaving the executive branch free to
determine foreign policy.2 32
An FCPA private right of action poses additional problems
that stem from the FCPA's unilateral nature. The United
States is the only country to forbid overseas bribery.2 " If the
FCPA carries with it a private civil RICO action for treble dam-
ages, a foreign corporation could recover for a U.S. corpora-
tion's violation. The U.S. corporation, however, would have
no recourse against the foreign corporation bribing a third
country's official since an FCPA violation requires a U.S. con-
tact.
Even if the executive branch decides to allow a private in-
dividual to bring a civil RICO action against a foreign official,
the courts may decline jurisdiction based on the principle of
separation of powers. 34 The executive branch's use of the ju-
diciary to inquire into some sovereign acts, but not others,
constitutes an unconstitutional violation of the principle of
separation of powers by executive branch delegation of foreign
policy responsibilities to the judicial branch. 35 The power of
U.S. judicial inquiry to affect foreign policy, viewed in light of
the pre-FCPA scandals, is great.23" An executive decision to
allow embarrassment of a foreign government is not a proper
basis for extending or contracting the jurisdiction of the judi-
cial branch into a foreign forum.23'
A final argument against using civil RICO to privatize U.S.
foreign policy is the potentially unwholesome motivation of
the frustrated party in a contract bidding. A private civil RICO
action would provide a means to use the courts to inquire into
231. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (describing types of prohib-
ited payments).
232. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing separation of powers
and act of state doctrine concerns).
233. See Gevurtz, Using the Antitrust Laws to Combat Overseas Bribery by Foreign Com-
panies: A Step to Even the Odds in International Trade, 27 VA.J. INT'L L. 211, 212-14
(1987).
234. Cf First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 790
(1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing requirement of executive approval for ju-
dicial branch inquiry as violation of doctrine of separation of powers).
235. Cf id.
236. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing pre-FCPA scan-
dals).
237. Cf First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 790.
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the actions of the party who won the contract, especially where
the winner was not the low bidder. The U.S. judicial system,
through its process of discovery, becomes the hired factfinder,
compelling enterprises operating in a foreign forum that may
have only a minuscule U.S. ownership to surrender their
records. If the plaintiff happens to find an FCPA violation,
treble damages and attorney's fees provide an attractive rec-
ompense. If the defendant has anything it does not wish to
disclose for legitimate reasons, especially in countries with cul-
tural biases against discovery, the civil RICO action becomes a
means of extortion.
D. Solution to the RICO Problem
Currently, courts are fashioning complicated standing re-
quirements under civil RICO by narrowly construing the re-
quirement that the plaintiff be injured "by reason of" a RICO
violation in a fashion analogous to the way that courts have
narrowly construed the "antitrust injury" in antitrust cases.238
These distinctions are inefficient and without legal basis. A re-
turn to principled statutory construction, where the court actu-
ally interprets conflicting statutory schemes in light of the pur-
poses of those statutes would immediately solve the problem.
Under traditional statutory analysis, where the express provi-
sions of one statute would render another statute's provisions
meaningless, the court looks to the legislative intent behind
the two statutes to determine the proper remedy.23 9 In addi-
tion, the enactment of a regulatory scheme under Securities
and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Department ofJustice
238. Compare Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1989) and
Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1988) (denying RICO stand-
ing to employee discharged for refusal to participate in fraudulent bank loan scheme)
and Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926 (11 th Cir. 1987) (granting RICO standing to em-
ployee discharged for report of irregular transactions to government) with Kansas
and Missouri v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807, 2810 (1990) (discussing re-
quirements for showing "antitrust injury").
239. See United States v. Blondek, 741 F. Supp. 116 (rejecting suit against for-
eign official who accepted bribe despite broad language of conspiracy statute because
of narrower FCPA language), a]J'd sub nom. United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th
Cir. 1991). The U.S. Supreme Court has traditionally narrowed the scope of broad
penalties where Congress subsequently legislated lesser penalties covering the same
behavior. See, e.g., United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U.S. 450 (1921) (holding that
penalty provisions of general revenue laws repealed when Congress later enacted
lesser penalties in more specific statute).
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authority to provide guidance to corporations operating
abroad should, in itself, imply a congressional intent to pro-
vide immunity from civil RICO suits. 240 Accordingly, in apply-
ing civil RICO to the FCPA, the court should look to the intent
of Congress, and determine whether the remedy sought serves
or subverts that intent.
Congressional mandates that a statute be construed liber-
ally "in light of" remedial purposes do not mean that the stat-
ute be construed literally "in spite of" its remedial pur-
poses.24 ' Although a literal reading of civil RICO provides an
express right of action in the FCPA context, if its "remedial"
purposes are ignored, such a superficial reading creates an in-
consistent, costly, and destructive result. In enacting civil
RICO, Congress did not intend to create a general federal
treble damages remedy for all interstate criminal actions in-
volving fraud.242 Accordingly, civil RICO does not apply to
240. Cf United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 732-
34 (1975) (finding SEC's regulatory authority sufficiently pervasive to confer impled
immunity from antitrust liability); Gordon v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S.
659, 685 (1975) (stating implied repeal of antitrust laws necessary to effectuate provi-
sions giving SEC direct regulatory power over exchange rules and practices).
241. See Lynch, supra note 77, at 664. One commentator has noted:
Though careful commentators have concluded that Congress intended
RICO as a specific response to the problem of criminal infiltration of legiti-
mate enterprises, courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States,
and at least one highly influential commentator have found in the legislative
history much broader purposes and have used their findings to justify
sweeping interpretations of the statute. Since the latter view, which has had
considerable influence on the development of the law, is wrong, and the
commentators who criticize it have presented their conclusions in summary
form, a careful review of the evidence [of congressional intent] is necessary
to set the record straight.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
242. See RICO Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm.
on the Judiciaty House of Representatives 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. on H.R. 2517, H.R.
2943, H.R. 4892, H.R. 5290, H.R. 5391, and H.R. 5445, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
364-70 (1986) (letter of John R. Bolton, Assistant Attorney General). The Depart-
ment of Justice noted that
When it enacted section 1964(c) as part of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, Congress hoped that private civil suits would assist in preventing
infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime, [but] that hope has
not been realized. Fewer than ten percent of private civil RICO actions have
been based on what is ordinarily considered to be organized crime activity.
Instead, the vast majority of actions has [sic] arisen out of commonplace
commercial transactions allegedly involving fraud on the part of businesses
and individuals that have no connection to organized crime ....
We do not believe that, when it enacted RICO, Congress thought it
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FCPA violations. This approach to statutory construction has
been used successfully in the FCPA context before. 4 3 Any
other result would be judicial legislation, eliminating the years
of work Congress spent amending the FCPA.24 4
CONCLUSION
Statutory construction mandates that the FCPA's statutory
scheme be respected at the expense of a private civil RICO
right of action. Alternatively, as a less efficient compromise,
congressional enactment of an exclusivity provision of the type
envisioned by the Senate would limit enforcement to those in-
stances envisioned by Congress when it crafted the legislation.
At least some of Congress's goals in amending the FCPA
thereby would be realized, and corporate and individual de-
fendants would no longer be at the mercy of unlimited, unwar-
ranted private litigation.
RaymondJ. Dowd*
necessary to create a general federal remedy for fraud, or that it intended to
do so.
Id. at 364-65.
243. See supra note 101 (discussing Blondek, where conspiracy statute not applied
despite plain language due to FCPA's statutory scheme and purpose).
244. See Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PENN. L. REV.
1007, 1064 (1989). The commentator noted that
[s]ometimes, rather than providing too little policy guidance, Congress pro-
vides too much guidance, pushing the Court in different directions. In these
cases, there is no way the Court can avoid compromising one or more statu-
tory policies, and the use of public values analysis to make these hard
choices is consistent with legislative supremacy. For example, Congress
sometimes enacts a statute that on its face clashes with earlier enactments.
The Court's narrowing interpretation to avoid implicit, unintended repeals
subserves rather than undermines legislative supremacy.
Id. at 1064 (citation omitted).
* J.D. Candidate, 1991, Fordham University.
